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Resumo: Esse ensaio argumenta que, na obra de Coetzee, a escritura é sempre representada 
como  uma  apreensão  violenta  da  alteridade.  Mas  a  escritura  é  também  representada,  
repetitivamente, como o malogro para representar o outro, marcado por seu corpo. É esse  
malogro que  Foe propõe a perscrutar. Reconhecendo o malogro da autoridade escritural, a 
falha em possuir na interpretação a marca de alteridade, abre o leitor (escritural), sempre, ao 
(auto) questionamento. E essa (auto) interrogação é precisamente o que mitiga o ostensivo 
poder autoral. Nessa abertura, nesse reconhecimento da reiteração e reavaliação sem fim, jaz 
a possibilidade de novas narrativas para a leitura do sujeito e uma política que começa no  
autoquestionamento e na recusa da autoridade. Assim, esse ensaio aborda a obra de Coetzee 
usando as abordagens teóricas de Gubar, Spivak, Parry e Levinas.
Palavras-Chave:  Escritura;  malogro  da  representação;  autoridade  escritural; 
autoinvestigação. 
Abstract: This essay argues that in Coetzee’s work, writing is always represented as the 
violent apprehension of otherness. But writing is also represented, over and over again, as 
the failure to represent the other, marked by his/her body. It is this failure that Foe exposes 
to scrutiny. Recognizing the failure of writerly authority, the failure to own in interpretation 
the mark of otherness, opens, the (writing) reader, always, to (self) questioning. And this  
(self) interrogation is precisely what mitigates ostensible authorial power. In that opening, in 
that recognition of endless reiteration and reevaluation, lies the possibility of new narratives 
for the reading self and a politics that begins in self-questioning and the refusal of authority.  
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Thus, the essay approaches Coetzee’s work by using assumptions by Gubar, Spivak, Parry 
and Levinas.
Key-words: Writing; failure of representation; writerly authority; self-interrogation. 
“[Foe] is not a retreat from the subject of colonialism or from questions of 
power. …[It asks]  who writes? Who takes up the position of power, pen in 
hand?”
J.M. Coetzee “Two Interviews” 462 (emphasis original)
“Print … is sadism, and properly evokes terror.”
J.M. Coetzee  Dusklands 14
One
Much  contemporary  literary  criticism  and  the  literature  it  explores, 
particularly  when  of  a  feminist  or  postcolonial  bent,  makes  extensive  use  of 
metaphors of textuality and voice to explore interpersonal power relations. How and 
why such tropes are ubiquitous in our current cultural moment is a subject worthy of 
extended discussion, although beyond the scope of my essay.  I am interested, rather, 
in  the  kinds  of  assumptions  that  underpin,  and  derive  from,  the  use  of  these 
metaphors and the politics to which they gesture. The figurative questions raised via 
these tropes are familiar ones: who is empowered to ‘write’ (for) the ‘other’ (the 
other,  that  is,  positioned  as disempowered  other  by  virtue  of  hegemonic 
writing/discourse)? Can the other ‘voice’ an oppositional or even alternative identity 
and history to that spoken by those with greater ‘author-ity’ (to indulge in familiar 
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word-play)?  More  pressingly,  perhaps,  in  our  postcolonial  moment,  can  one 
responsibly speak with or even write of (if not for) those othered in our very acts of 
speaking and writing?
Few would dispute that the work of J.M. Coetzee is deeply concerned with 
such  questions. While  it  could  be  said  that  all  of  Coetzee’s  novels  open  to 
consideration in these terms, I will here focus on Foe (1986) in which questions to do 
with textuality, voice and authorial power are quite explicitly foregrounded. It is my 
contention that in this novel Coetzee not only utilizes but challenges the efficacy of 
what I will refer to as ‘tropes of textuality and voice,’ or rather the essentialism that 
often underpins their use. Further, I will argue, Coetzee’s work encourages a shift in 
the metaphorical critical terrain he so deliberately traverses, opening to scrutiny not 
only the role (and responsibility) of the writer, but also the affective responses – and 
responsibility – of readers.
As a means of framing the ensuing discussion of Foe, I will briefly consider 
two well-known essays, both published in the same decade as Coetzee’s novel, and 
so both part  of the intellectual/critical climate in which he wrote: Susan Gubar’s 
“‘The  Blank  Page’  and  the  Issues  of  Female  Creativity”  (1980)  and  Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak’s “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (1985/1988/1999).1 My choice of 
these essays is not arbitrary, as will become clear in what follows. Pertinently, both 
essays  employ  metaphors  of  textuality  and  voice  albeit  in  the  service  of  quite 
divergent  ends.   In  “The Blank Page,” Gubar  develops  a  series  of  metaphors  to 
consider the (gendered)  relationship between creating self  and created other.  The 
most fully considered is the “model of the pen-penis writing on the virgin page” (p. 
77), in which the male creator-author violently appropriates the female (as object) 
who is “‘read’ or written into textuality” (p.75). The act of inscription is equated with 
1
 Spivak revised her essay a number of times and it exists in several published versions, as well as  
having been extensively anthologized.  The earliest version of the essay was published in  Wedge in 
1985, although the best-known is that which appeared in 1988 in Cary Nelson and Larry Grossberg, 
eds.  Marxism and the interpretation of Culture. This version is reproduced in Patrick Williams and 
Laura Chrisman, eds.  Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial Theory: A Reader (1993).  A later and 
further revised version appeared in Spivak’s  Toward a History of the Vanishing Present (1999) and 
this is reproduced, abbreviated by the author, in in Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin,  
eds.,  The Post-Colonial Studies Reader, 2nd ed (2006).  In this essay I draw on the 1988 version, as 
reproduced in Williams and Chrisman, eds., referring to this as (1993 [1988]), and also on the 1999 
version, as reproduced and abbreviated in Ashcroft,  Griffiths and Tiffin,  eds.,  referring to this as  
(2006 [1999]).
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(violent) sexual ‘pen-etration,’ a metaphor extensively developed in Gubar’s other 
work, notably in The Madwoman in the Attic, jointly authored with Sandra Gilbert. 
While much of the essay considers the literal struggle of nineteenth and twentieth 
century  women  to  write  independently  under  patriarchal  constraints,  it  is  more 
fundamentally  concerned,  via  figural  extension,  with  the  possibility  of  women’s 
autonomy in a fuller sense.  In short, Gubar asks whether it is possible for women to 
‘write’ (for) themselves independent of patriarchal authority. 
Central to Gubar’s argument is her reading of Isak Dinesen’s evocative short 
story “The Blank Page” which
…  centers on the sisters of a Carmelite order of nuns who grow flax to 
manufacture the most exquisite linen in Portugal.  This linen is so fine 
that it is used for the bridal sheets of all the neighboring royal houses. 
After the wedding night, it is solemnly and publicly displayed to attest to 
the virginity of the princess and then is reclaimed by the convent where 
the central piece of the stained sheet ‘which bore witness to the honour of 
a royal bride’ is mounted, framed, and hung in a long gallery with a plate 
identifying  the  name  of  the  princes.   These  ‘faded  markings’  on  the 
sheets are of special interest to female pilgrims who journey to the remote 
country convent, for ‘each separate canvas with its coroneted name-plate 
has a story to tell, and each has been set up in loyalty to the story.’  But 
the  pilgrims  and  sisters  alike  are  especially  fascinated  by  the  framed 
canvas over the one nameless plate which displays the blank, snow-white 
sheet that gives the story its title. (p. 78)
Gubar  reads  the  stained  (framed)  sheets  as  “biographical  remnants  of 
otherwise mute existences, a result of and response to life rather than producing an 
independent aesthetic object” (p. 78), and argues that for many women “the body is 
the only accessible medium for self-expression” (p. 79), a claim which, by the end of 
the  essay,  begins  to  rely  very  problematically  on  a  series  of  essentialist  claims 
grounded in the materiality of the female body. By ‘framing’ the sacrificial blood, by 
“making  the  sheets  into  objects  as  sacred  as  alter  cloths,”  she  claims,  the  nuns 
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collude with and reiterate “the [patriarchal] story”: “The framed sheets imply, then, 
that all the royal princesses have been ‘framed’ into telling the same story, namely 
the story of their acquiescence as objects of exchange” (p. 84).
So to Gubar’s central question: “how can women experience creativity?” (p. 
86);  what  scope have they for  self-expression? For  Gubar,  within the patriarchal 
textual/sexual economy women’s (self) writing can only ever mean “being possessed 
and wounded” (p.  86),  “experienced quite literally as the terror of being entered, 
deflowered,  possessed,  taken,  had,  broken,  ravished” (p.  86).   If  this  is  so,  what 
alternatives  are  there,  for  women,  for  agential  authorship  without  appropriative 
violation?  Gubar proposes that the blank page, the unmarked sheet at the centre of 
Dinesen’s story, can be read as an “alternative to the bloody sheets that surround it” 
(p. 88-89) – as a female refusal to be wounded in/as writing.  The blank page, then,  
should be read not as “a sign of innocence, or purity or passivity” but as a “potent act 
of resistance,” as “radically subversive” (p. 89).
It is here that the essay, over-freighted with metaphor, collapses in on its own 
argument. Let us not forget that the blank page is blank.  It tells no story; it offers no 
resistance in and of itself – except by virtue of the meaning imposed by the act of 
framing itself, or when considered in relation to the bloodied sheets that surround it. 
It is only the site of potentiality for another’s inscription: it is a blankness that must 
be bordered/bounded, or overwritten, in order to mean.  Whatever its author’s story 
was, is lost and can only be retrieved by another appropriation, that of an inscribing 
reader, a framing curator.  On that blank potentiality any number of stories can be 
written. And so Gubar takes up the pen:
Was this anonymous royal princess not a virgin on her wedding night? 
Did she, perhaps, run away from the marriage bed and thereby retain her 
virginity intact?  Did she, like Scheherazade, spend her time in bed telling 
stories so as to escape the fate of her predecessors? Or again; maybe the 
snow-white  sheet  above the nameless  plate  tells  the story of  a young 
woman  who met  up  with  an  impotent  husband,  or  of  a  woman  who 
learned other erotic arts, or of a woman who consecrated herself to the 
nun’s vow of chastity but within marriage.  Indeed, the interpretation of 
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this sheet seems as impenetrable as the anonymous princess herself. (p. 
89)
Yes, indeed, the sheet is impenetrable to interpretation. But in what follows, 
Gubar interprets it nonetheless: “blankness here is an act of defiance, a dangerous 
and risky refusal to certify purity.  The resistance of the princess allows for self-
expression, for she makes her statement by not writing what she is expected to write” 
(p. 89).
What I want to hold onto here, for the purposes of what follows, is Gubar’s 
claim  that  blankness  is  a  form  of  resistance  that  somehow  “allows  for  self-
expression.” There are several points worth noting. For a start, but crucially, Gubar 
ignores her own act of interpretative authority in asserting the woman’s resistance, 
simply asserting – as the result of her imaginative reading/writing – self-expressive 
agency outside  an economy of  inscription or  interpretation.   And yet,  of  course, 
whatever  meaning  is  read  in/on  the  blank  page  is  retrospective  of  any  original 
authorial intent, if intent there was. While Gubar’s reading of the blank page may be 
redemptive or resistant, it comes at the price of her own interpretative inscription on 
the other’s blankness. Gubar, too, has framed the unnamed noblewoman.2
Two
“Here is a woman who tried to be decisive in extremis.  She ‘spoke,’ but  
women did not, do not, ‘hear’ her.”
Spivak “Can the Subaltern Speak?” 2006 [1999] 28
The above brief discussion of Gubar’s article is not intended as a challenge to 
the writer  per  se.   I  am less  concerned with her  specific  application of  a  set  of 
metaphors equating sexuality, textuality and identity (which needs to be situated in a 
2
 There are other stories, of course, that might be written on/of the blank sheet, not least a story of  
warning or threat (possibly the intention of the men, and their acolytes, who framed it). Perhaps the 
princess was killed, literally silenced, or otherwise absented – for infidelity, for transgression, for  
refusal.  In this case the blank page might tell another, more terrible story that cuts against Gubar’s:  
that of a final silencing and the erasure of name and identity. 
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certain moment of feminist politics in the 1980s – importantly, the decade in which 
Coetzee wrote  Foe)3,  than with her work as an example of the ubiquitous use in 
literary  criticism  more  generally  of  tropes  of  textuality  and  voice  to  articulate 
self/other  engagement,  and  the  political  claims  that  result.  Such  tropes  are  not 
restricted to gendered criticism, of course, and feature in many postcolonial accounts. 
So the colonised other is often figured as the blank page inscribed by the colonial 
pen(is);  silenced  (or  raped)  in  an  appropriative  blood-sacrifice  that  births  the 
coloniser’s  story  of  ownership,  civility  and selfhood.4  Thus  coloniser/colonised, 
white/black,  male/female  (or  any  number  of  other  binary  pairs)  are  opposed  as 
writing subject and written other, authoritative author and passive text, speaker and 
spoken, and so on. When a simplistic notion of the dynamics of reading and writing 
(involving, for example, a conception of unproblematically authoritative authorship) 
informs the metaphoric vehicle, problems abound, not least the positing of deeply 
problematic ‘solutions’ – such as silence or blankness – as a means of resisting the 
violence of authoritative ‘writing’ or as an alternative mode of self-expression. This 
begs  an  important  question:  does  the  other  have  any capacity  to  write/voice 
him/herself,  to resist  the hegemonic (colonial,  masculine, racist) narratives within 
which s/he is objectified?  To shift the metaphor from writing to speech (a common 
shift in contemporary critical discourse, and not only for those following the work of 
Jacques Derrida), in Gayatri Chakravorti  Spivak’s famous formulation:  “Can the 
subaltern speak?” 
Clearly for Gubar,  yes – but  only in silence retrospectively  interpreted as 
agential choice. In her terms, those silenced by virtue of another’s empowered voice 
can ‘speak’ – if only,  paradoxically,  by being silent.  This paradox turns on two 
competing interpretations of silence – one suggesting enforced disempowerment, the 
other  imagined as  chosen resistance,  a  point  to which I’ll  certainly return in my 
discussion of Foe. Women’s silence, in Gubar’s account, is reclaimed as intentional 
agency that is appparently  chosen and meaningful in consequence.  Likewise, for 
some commentators in the postcolonial arena of debate, the colonised’s resistance is 
3
 Toril Moi’s Sexual/Textual Politics: Feminist Literary Theory (1985) must have mention here.
4
 This is, of course, not to deny the fact of violent appropriation of indigenous people, their history and 
their  lands and the  concomitant  denial  of  their  agency that  is  often the  consequence of  colonial 
encounter. My concern here is with the metaphorical representation of colonisation and its aftermath.
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figured as  chosen exclusion from the coloniser’s discursive arena: as a refusal of 
intercourse, at least on the terms or in the language of those empowered. In this way, 
loss  and  disempowerment  are  made  good  in  what  is  paradoxically  another 
(interpretative) overwriting.
In  reply  to  her  own  question,  Spivak  answers  emphatically,  in  an  early 
version of her essay: “the subaltern cannot speak” (1993 [1988], p.  104). It is an 
answer  that  has generated many angry responses,  considerable  misunderstanding, 
significant critical debate, and extensive defensive commentary (and rewriting of her 
original essay) by Spivak who claimed, in a later version of the essay, that her earlier  
comment was an “inadvisable remark” (2006 [1999], p.  35). It is not my intention to 
retrace  these  debates  here.  However,  the  congruencies  and  divergences  between 
Gubar’s and Spivak’s essays can be fruitfully explored for my purposes with respect 
to Coetzee’s Foe. Both ask whether it is possible for women/the subaltern (or, what I 
have called the  ‘other’)  to  ‘write’  or  ‘speak’  within  an expressive  economy that 
denies her agency or voice.  Both ask whether silence or self-erasure can be (read as) 
a form of refusal, of agential self-articulation.  Where the two critics differ markedly 
is not only in their divergent answers to this question, but in Gubar’s blindness to her 
own  reading of the silent other figured as ‘blank page’ and, in contrast, Spivak’s 
heightened awareness and foregrounding of her own role as (academic) reader.
In her essay Spivak considers “the regulative psychobiography of [Indian] 
widow-immolation [sati]”  in order  to track what  she calls the “double silencing” 
(2006 [1999], p. 32) of subaltern women – the failures of their representation in both 
senses  of  that  word:  political  representation  (‘speaking  for,’  vertreten)  and 
aesthetic/theoretical  re-presentation  (‘portrayal,’  darstellen;  2006  [1999],  p.  30). 
Between these two “sentences,” claims Spivak, “one cannot put together a ‘voice’” 
(2006 [1999], p. 33) for the  sati widow (here emblematic of the subaltern subject 
whose  ‘text’  or  ‘story’  –  in  life  as  in  death  –  is  written,  or  in  Spivak’s  term, 
“overdetermined”  by  plural  hegemonic  discourses).   Proceeding  “by  way  of  an 
example,”  Spivak  describes  the  suicide  of  a  young,  unmarried  Bengali  woman, 
Bhubaneswari Bhaduri, in 1926, as “an unemphatic, ad hoc, subaltern rewriting of 
the social text of  sati-suicide” (2006 [1999], p. 34).  Did Bhaduri, in choosing the 
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most extreme refusal of voice, suicide, manage nonethless to ‘speak’ for herself and 
refuse the terms of the ‘social text’  in which her subalternity was written,  a text 
which ironically anticipated and required her (later) suicide / sacrifice via  sati? In 
choosing  suicide  ostensibly  on  her  own  terms,  then,  could  Bhaduri  refuse  her 
predetermined, scripted social role? Despite the fact that the young woman appears 
to  have  timed  her  suicide  for  when  she  was  menstruating,  to  obviate  the 
misassumption that she was pregnant, subsequent familial (and female) readings of 
the young woman’s ‘text’/death overwrite her intentions (whatever they were): her 
suicide was dismissed as the result of an illicit affair, or delirium, or melancholia as a 
result of her father’s recent death. A decade later, a letter from Bhaduri to her sister, 
written  at  the  time  of  her  suicide,  revealed  that  she  was  a  covert  member  of  a 
resistance group charged with a political assignation that she felt unable to perform. 
Despite this revelation, (female) family members continued to treat the suicide as 
shameful and as “a case of illicit love” (2006 [1999], p. 35). In this way, suggests  
Spivak, although Bhaduri attempted to “‘speak’ by turning her body into a text of 
woman/writing,” “her attempt … failed” (2006 [1999] 35). Even if her suicide was 
an attempt to articulate a resistant self, subsequent readings of her act, and the blank 
page of her now silent body, only serve to obliterate any agential ‘speech.’
In a notable revision to her earlier claim that “the subaltern cannot speak,” 
Spivak writes in a later version of her essay, “The subaltern as female  cannot be 
heard or read” (2006 [1999], p. 35; my emphasis]. This important qualification shifts 
questions  from  those  of  ‘speakerly’  agency  to  reader/listener  interpretation.  The 
question is not,  of course,  whether or not  sati wives (or Bhaduri)  literally spoke 
before or during immolation / suicide, or were able to do so (as suggested by some of 
Spivak’s critics, spectacularly missing her point – and this, too, is relevant to my 
discussion of  Foe).  Even if  they had literally spoken,  they would not  have been 
“heard or read” in Spivak’s metaphoric sense. Spivak is thus less concerned with 
what  sati  widows might (not) have said than with the essentialist assumptions of 
those who read sati widows after their deaths – not only those evoking the authority 
of tradition but also (Western) cultural theorists and historians who, in ‘reading’ sati, 
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imagine a  European agential  subject  and then proceed to  give her  voice (just  as 
Gubar does for her princess): 
Between  patriarchy  and  imperialism,  subject-constitution  and  object-
formation,  the  figure  of  the  woman  disappears,  not  into  a  pristine  
nothingness, but into a violent shuttling which is the displaced figuration 
of the ‘third world woman’ caught between tradition and modernization. 
(Spivak, 1993 [1988], p. 102; my emphasis) 
It is in this sense that the subaltern “does not speak” (is not heard, is not read) 
for  Spivak;  rather  she  is  (re)produced  in  ventriloquial  critical  gestures  that 
worryingly  echo  gestures  of  colonial  benevolence,  while  in  fact  reproducing the 
discursive violence of imperialism (or patriarchy).5  
Benita Parry’s response to Spivak’s essay is well known. (Parry is a notable 
Coetzee critic, engaging most particularly with questions of voice and silence in his 
writing.) Parry claims Spivak (and others “concerned with deconstructing the texts of 
colonialism” (Postcolonial Studies 14)) denies or refuses the agency of the “native” 
in her work, and counters this by insisting on the need for a “conception of the native 
as historical subject and agent of an oppositional discourse” (Postcolonial Studies 28; 
my emphasis). In effect, she urges contemporary critics to conceptually recover, via 
academic  (re)conceptualisation, historically  repressed  subaltern  knowledge  or 
‘voice.’ In response, Spivak argues that “the moot decipherment by another in an 
academic institution … many years later must not be too quickly identified with the 
‘speaking’ of the subaltern” (A Critique of Postcolonial Reason 309).  Speech, on her 
account,  is  always  intersubjective,  a  “transaction  between  speaker  and  listener” 
(“Subaltern Talk” 289), and not to be confused with sympathetic vocalisation by an 
empowered  other.   Further,  as  an  intersubjective  act,  speech  is  bound  by extra-
personal (inevitably epistemic) ‘presuppositions’ and ‘regulations,’ however deeply 
internalised these are.
5
 “[T]he ventriloquism of the speaking subaltern is the left intellectual’s stock-in-trade.” (Spivak 2006 
[1999], 28).
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That [autonomous speech] is what did not happen in the case of a woman 
who took her own body at the moment of death to inscribe a certain kind 
of … annulment of all  the presuppositions that underlie the regulative 
psychobiography that  writes  sati…. And even that  incredible effort  to 
speak did not fulfil itself in a speech act.  (“Subaltern Talk”, p.  289)
Spivak continues, in the same interview:
The actual fact of giving utterance was not what I was concerned about. 
What I was concerned about was that  even when one uttered, one was 
constructed by a certain kind of psychobiography, so that the utterance 
itself  –  this  is  another  side  of  the  argument  –  would  have  to  be  
interpreted in  the  way  in  which  we  historically  interpret  anything 
(“Subaltern Talk”, p. 291; my emphasis).
Here –  crucially,  I  would  argue –  Spivak  shifts  questions  from issues  of 
writing or being written (and essentialist notions of the writer’s autonomous agency 
that  lurk  in  such claims)  to  issues  of  intersubjective  interpretation,  from debates 
about authorial agency to ones of, if not reader responsibility via interpretation, then, 
at  least,  an inter-subjective engagement in which writerly authority is  necessarily 
qualified.
Three
“[H]e has the last word who disposes over the greatest force”
Susan speaking, Foe (p. 124)
As I’ve already suggested, in Coetzee’s novels oppressive relationships are 
frequently figured with recourse to metaphors of writing and narration, or speech and 
silence.6
6
 See Attwell, Bongie, Chesney, Jolly, Kossew, Lewis, Macaskill and Colleran – and this list is by no 
means exclusive. Coetzee refers to the “gaze of the author” as “the gaze of authority and authoritative 
judgment” (Doubling the Point 368).  
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Characters whose disempowerment is ostensibly marked by blankness/silence 
abound  in  Coetzee’s  fiction:  the  eponymous  protagonist  of  Life  and  Times  of  
Michael K, the barbarian “girl” in Waiting for the Barbarians and the surly Verceuil 
in Age of Iron, are just some examples. The (white) would-be woman writer, Susan 
Barton, and Friday, the (black) man/slave, in  Foe, are exemplary. At first glance, 
Susan appears anything but silent, in contrast to mute Friday.  She volubly narrates 
the first three sections of Foe (a travelogue or autobiographical fragment, a series of 
letters,  and  a  first  person  narrative,  respectively),  all  the  while  offering  fertile 
pickings for feminist and postcolonial critics.  Coetzee situates Foe as an imaginary 
‘pre-text’ to Daniel Defoe’s ur-text of colonial endeavor and justification, Robinson 
Crusoe and,  less obviously,  but also importantly,  Roxana.   Susan, a  rescued 18th 
century castaway, ostensibly relates the story of her time on an unnamed island to the 
professional writer Foe7 to whom she has turned for assistance in the task of writing 
a saleable tale, provisionally titled  The Female Castaway. Foe seeks to selectively 
rewrite Susan’s story, relayed to him in a travelogue/memoir, a series of letters and 
in direct speech. Her story, as told to him, encompasses not only her time on the 
island with Cruso [Coetzee’s spelling]8 and Friday, but also the period before it in 
which  she  looked  for  her  lost  daughter  in  Bahia.   Despite  her  stated  desire  for 
authenticity, Susan comes to recognize that truth – particularly when mundane – is 
not  the  prerogative  of  (commercial)  fiction,  or  even  history:  “the  world  expects 
stories from its adventurers” (p. 34), she reflects, and writes to Foe of  “the history 
[he] write[s]”: “it must not only tell the truth about us but please its readers too” (p. 
63). But, as she acknowledges in a letter to Foe, “You know how dull our life was in 
truth” (81).   In another letter, she queries “Without desire how is it possible to make 
a story? … I  ask myself  what  past  historians of the castaway state  have done – 
whether in despair they have not begun to make up lies” (p. 88).9 Of course Coetzee 
alludes here to the fact that Daniel Defoe’s  Robinson Crusoe, strikingly lacking in 
7
 Coetzee alludes to the well-known fact that  Defoe’s was born Daniel Foe and only as an adult  
changed his name to the more ‘gentile’ version by which we know him now. By returning to Defoe’s  
“proper patronymic” (Spivak  Theory 7)  Coetzee also invites readers to consider  Foe as a  foe (of 
Susan? Of Friday?).  
8
 See Bongie on the significance of the missing ‘e’ in Cruso’s name and elsewhere in Foe.
9
 Susan writes to Foe of “the history [he] write[s]”: “it must not only tell the truth about us but please 
its readers too” (63).
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(sexual)  desire,  was  originally  received  as  a  ‘true’  account  of  a  castaway’s 
experience (and written in the mode of journalistic (autobiographical) reportage) and 
also to the many and extensive contemporary debates about the  fictional nature of 
novelistic  realism  and  its  ideological  functioning,  and  debates  about  desire  in 
writing.10
Within  the  text,  Susan’s  desire  to  take  possession  of  her  own  life,  to 
autonomously  (self)  narrate,  is  made  explicit  in  several  extended  passages  of 
metafictional debate in which she resists Foe’s attempts to rewrite her (life) story. 
While she certainly has a  literal voice through much of  Foe (she not only speaks 
with  Foe  and  Friday,  and  other  characters,  within  the  fictional  heterocosm  and 
defends her story and its authorship, but also acts as Coetzee’s narrator for the most 
part), she is nonetheless progressively silenced in metaphorical terms as the novel 
progresses.   Ultimately,  as  we  realize  (if  with  the  benefit  of  literary  historical 
hindsight), she is ‘written out’ of not only (De)Foe’s subsequent “history” (women 
are striking for their absence in Robinson Crusoe) but also of her role as Coetzee’s 
narrator. By the final fourth section of the novel she is literally voiceless: dead.
Coetzee thus appears to be directly addressing the issue of violating writing, 
and authorial power, so widely debated at the time the novel was written.  Perhaps 
not surprisingly, in doing so he casts more than a salutary glance towards the work of 
Gubar, a key feminist theorist at the time.  As Pamela Dunbar, among others, has 
noted, Coetzee is surely alluding to the work of Gubar (and Sandra Gilbert) in his  
portrayal of Susan’s “battle” with (her) Foe (p. 101), particularly when this battle is 
allegorized in a scene of copulation.  In  The Madwoman in the Attic,  Gilbert  and 
Gubar  ask,  “If  the  pen  is  a  metaphorical  penis,  with  what  organs  can  females 
generate texts?” (p. 73; quoted in Dunbar, 101).  Coetzee’s response to this question 
is perhaps parodic in his portrayal of Susan’s misguided belief that “the pen becomes 
10
 “Desire” is a significant and repeated word within the novel (see, for example, 86, 88, 121, 131). It  
is perhaps not coincidental that Nancy Armstrong published her groundbreaking feminist text, Desire 
and Domestic  Fiction:  A Political  History  of  the  Novel in  1987.  There are many account  of  the 
significance of desire in narrative, one of the finest being Peter Brooks’s Reading for the Plot [1984]. 
Brooks writes, for example, “If the motor of narrative is desire, totalizing, building ever-larger units of 
meaning,  the  ultimate  determinants  of  meaning  lie at  the  end,  and  narrative  desire  is  ultimately, 
inexorably, desire for the end” (52).
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mine while I write with it” (p. 66); “I am a free woman who asserts her freedom by  
telling  her  story  according to  her  own desire”  (p.  131),  she  says.   He offers  an 
account, instead, of her failure to claim the male pen(is), “to be father to [her] story” 
(p. 123), to become its “begetter” (p. 126). 
As I have argued elsewhere11 Parts One to Three of the novel index Susan’s 
decreasing narratorial authority, a fact that is underscored by the insertion of Foe – 
who initially features as the Susan’s absent addressee in the first two sections – into 
her  (ontological)  “order”  (p.  133)  in  the  third  section.   Here  the  two characters 
literally battle for control of Susan’s story – the right to write it/her.  Susan struggles  
to reject the “deceitful fatherhood” and “false paternity” (Connor, p. 183) of her ‘foe’ 
who attempts to foist an unwanted (invented) daughter on her (the allusions are to 
Roxana),12 and to restructure her narrative into a more pleasing aesthetic ‘whole.’ 
The gendered struggle for narratorial/procreative dominance is symbolically enacted 
in the sexual encounter between the two described at the end of Part Three. Susan 
insists she is not “a mere receptacle ready to accommodate whatever story is stuffed 
into me” (p. 130).  During intercourse she adopts a position of (symbolic) sexual 
dominance: she “straddle[s] him” (p. 139).  Noting Foe’s unease at this she says 
“This is the manner of the Muse when she visits her poets …. [I]t is always a hard 
ride when the Muse pays her visits…. She must do whatever lies in her power to 
father her offspring” (p. 139-140; my emphasis). The scene is fraught with irony, for 
the knowledge that readers of Robinson Crusoe bring to the text is that Susan failed 
in  her  bid  for  paternity:  she  was  written  out  of  Defoe’s  novel. In  the  (far  too) 
simplistic  terms of  a  gendered  politics  of  writing,  then,  Susan  can  be  read  as  a 
woman ‘silenced’ by masculine (narrative) authority.  She is mastered and finally 
authored by (De)Foe.
Gender politics, however, are not Coetzee’s sole or even primary concern in 
the novel. In stark contrast to the naïvely voluble Man Friday in  Robinson Crusoe, 
and the speech of Susan, Coetzee’s Friday – explicitly portrayed as black – is mute, a 
muteness  figured by his tonguelessness (and my stress on the figural is important). 
11
 Worthington, Self as Narrative, 236-75.
12
  For a discussion of Coetzee’s allusions to Roxana, see Spivak, “Theory in the Margins.”
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Although some of  his  acts  could be  read  as  non-verbal  signing (his  dancing,  or 
scattering petals on the water, for example), his exclusion from a shared linguistic or 
ontological “order” (p. 133) empties them of the capacity to mean for others: they are 
not dialogic nor do they partake in a shared system of symbolic exchange. Whether 
this  ex-communication  is  chosen  or  imposed  is  irrelevant;  excluded  from  the 
intersubjective order of language/signing, Friday is merely an object written (on) by 
readers within and of the novel’s order. He does not “speak,” in Spivak’s original 
sense.
As  several  readers  have  noted,  the  absence  of  Friday’s  tongue  is  only  a 
supposition on the part of Susan, itself based on Cruso’s suppositions.13 Susan admits 
to being unable to look inside Friday’s mouth when asked to do so by Cruso (p. 85).  
Similarly,  that  Friday  has  been  possibly  been  castrated  is  only  offered  up  as  a 
possibility, not a confirmed fact.14 Lewis MacLeod takes issue with what he sees as 
the mistaken critical assumption that Friday is literally tongueless: “all critics of Foe 
operate under some assumption that Friday is the subject of some kind of radical 
mutilation” (p. 7), he asserts. Instead, he suggests, “it’s possible to suppose Friday 
possesses a tongue and consequently to read Friday’s silence as a  voluntary act, to 
think  Friday  has  the  capacity,  just  not  the  inclination,  for  speech”  (p.  7;  my 
emphasis). He thus invites exploration of the “unexamined possibility that Friday is 
merely  silent”  (p.  11).  (Merely?)  To  my  mind,  setting  aside  a  somewhat  naïve 
imputation  of  intentionality  for  the  character  Friday  (evident  in  such  claims  as 
“Friday apparently thinks …” (p. 7)), MacLeod here enacts what we might call a 
Gubaresque move open to critique in the terms discussed above – in imagining that 
Friday’s speechlessness is chosen MacLeod ‘writes’ a story of resistance onto the 
‘blank page’ of Friday.  Even more importantly, even if Friday’s silence is chosen, as 
Spivak argues so vociferously in the essay discussed above, it is no defence against 
being spoken for, however benevolent the intention of retrospective ventiloquists. 
MacLeod, while charging other critics with “tak[ing] [Friday’s] tongue away [to] use 
him for their own ends” (p. 11), remains ironically unaware of his own appropriative 
13
 For example, see Attridge, J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading. 81, fn 18.
14
 119-20; his ostensible lack of a pen(is) perhaps figuring his lack of authorial power in Gubar’s  
terms or, importantly, his lack of desire: “why did you not desire me …?” Susan asks of him (86). See 
also Dominic Head, J.M. Coetzee 120.
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critical practice, which does precisely the same. Whether or not Friday has a tongue, 
whether or not his voicelessness is voluntary, is a moot point. What matters is that 
his silence, his refusal or inability to engage in ‘speech’  means he is (over)written 
by  Cruso,  Susan,  Foe  and,  ironically,  also  by  Coetzee’s  most  well-intentioned 
readers: in the face of his silence, “he is to the world … what [they] make of him” (p. 
121-22), a point Coetzee emphasizes again and again.  
Coetzee quite specifically draws attention to such issues. Susan is portrayed 
as mistakenly assuming that her silences are different from those of Friday because 
she chooses, in some instances, not to speak. She says to Foe,
You err most tellingly in failing to distinguish between my silences and 
the silences of a being such as Friday. … No matter what he is to himself 
(is he anything to himself? – how can he tell us?), what he is to the world 
is  what  I make of him.  Therefore the silence of Friday is  a helpless  
silence. … Whereas the silence I keep regarding Bahia and other matters 
is chosen and purposeful: it is my own silence. (p. 122)
Soon after, she distinguishes herself from the dead whose “eternal silence” 
leaves a writer like Foe “to make of their stories whatever [he] fanc[ies],” and insists 
that as a living speaker “[i]t is still in my power to guide and amend.  Above all, to 
withhold” (p. 123).15 But in this, as in so much else, Susan is shown to be deeply 
mistaken.  For all that she insists on their difference, throughout Foe Susan is linked 
to Friday, not least in Foe’s deeply ironic comment, “I would not rob you of your 
tongue  for  anything,  Susan”  (p.  150).   Susan  may  well  speak  in  the  novel,  but 
remains unheard and unread (recalling Spivak, above) in subsequent ‘history,’ just 
like Friday.
While the first three sections of the novel trace a debate about the agency of 
the female writer and her capacity to “speak” or “write” autonomously, they also 
expose  the  will-to-power  involved in  the  act  of  writing,  and its  complicity  with 
existing structures of power and authority.  Silenced by the voice/pen of patriarchy 
15
 In a similar fashion, following the death of Cruso, she says, “it is I who have disposal of all that 
Cruso leaves behind, which is the story of his island” (45).
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Susan  may  well  ultimately  be,  but  she  nonetheless  explicitly,  and  knowingly, 
subjects Friday to the same fate in her attempt to assert her authorship and authority. 
She says to Foe of him: “The true story [of Friday’s tongue] will not be heard till by  
art we have found a means of  giving voice to Friday” (p. 118; my italics).  She 
continues,
Friday has no command of words and therefore no defense against being re-
shaped day by day in conformity with the desires of others.  I say he is a cannibal and 
he becomes a cannibal [….]  What is the truth of Friday? [….] No matter what he is 
to himself … what he is to the world is what I make of him. (p. 121-2)
Just as Susan’s (self) narrative is ultimately overwritten by Foe in this 
imaginary  pretext  to  Robinson  Crusoe,  so  Susan  “make[s]”  Friday 
according to her own interpretative desires: in both cases the dynamics of 
authorial power are treated explicitly in figures of speech.  Interestingly, 
Susan initially advocates listening to the mute black man, “it is for us to 
descend into the mouth …. It is for us to open Friday’s mouth and hear 
what it holds” (142).  Foe is less inclined to listen and responds, “We 
must  make Friday’s  silence speak,  as  well  as  the silence surrounding 
Friday” (p. 142). 
But Coetzee does not leave things here, in a reiteration of the problem of the 
violence  of  writerly/speakerly  authority.   Nor,  crucially,  does  he  posit  Friday’s 
muteness or Susans’s silences as a solution to appropriation: quite clearly, blankness 
or silence (chosen or not), is no defense against being ‘written’ by another’s pen or 
‘spoken’  in  their  speech.  Further,  Coetzee  refuses  to  mollify the  reader  with  the 
comforting myth that s/he is somehow outside this arena of textual or, in Michael 
Marais’s term, of “interpretative authoritarianism.”16
Before  moving  on,  I  first  want  to  suggest  what  I  think  are  the  central 
questions posed by Coetzee in this, and much of his other writing: How might one 
counter the violence of textual hermeneutics, if one  accepts that it underwrites the 
16
 See Marais, “Interpretative Authoritarianism.”
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activity of narration – and is the ground of (self) conceptualisation?  This is not only 
to ask how one might speak or write the other without reinscribing the violence one 
seeks to critique; or to ask whether a silent other can be heard or read; or even to ask  
how the attempt not  to represent the other might be ethical.  It is also to ask about 
how silence or blankness – in the terms discussed above – might affect a reader and 
invite a different kind of hearing or, at the least, a reconsideration of what it means to 
listen.
Four
“[I]t is possible that some of us are not written, but merely are”
(Foe to Susan in Foe, p. 143).
With this in mind I would like to consider the enigmatic fourth and final part 
of  Foe.  In  this  Susan  no  longer  narrates.  Instead  an  unnamed,  first-person  and 
present-tense narrator provides two variations on a scene in which s/he discovers the 
bodies  of  the  characters  who  ‘lived’  in  the  pages  preceding.   As  I  have  argued 
elsewhere, Coetzee’s reader is here invited to adopt the position of unnamed narrator 
opened up by the pronoun ‘I,’ to undertake “the task of descending into that eye [I]” 
as Foe advocates at the end of Part Three (p. 141).17 In the first variant, the narrator 
ascends a staircase that is “dark and mean” (a present tense echo of Susan’s earlier 
description of the approach to Foe’s home at the start of Part Three) and, on reaching 
the upper landing, stumbles over the body of “a woman or a girl” (p. 153) who, 
described as “weigh[ing] no more than a sack of straw” (p. 153), recalls, perhaps, 
Susan’s refusal to be a “stuffed” woman, “hollow, without substance” (p. 131).18 The 
narrator then finds the bodies of an unnamed man and woman in bed, described in 
textual metaphors: “The skin [is] dry as paper …. [T]hey are quietly composed” (p. 
17
 See Worthington, Self as Narrative.
18
 “Substance” and “substantiality” are crucial words in the novel.  See, for example, 125, 131, 132, 
152. At the end of Part Three, Susan says to Foe, talking of the ‘invented daughter’: “she is substantial  
and I am substantial; and you too are substantial, no less and no more than any of us.  We are all alive, 
we are all substantial, we are all in the same world.” Foe’s telling reply is “You have omitted Friday.”  
(152).
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153).19 While there is nothing to definitively link these unnamed bodies with the 
daughter, Susan and Foe from the preceding narrative, we seem to be encouraged to 
do so given the described setting and number, age and gender of the bodies. 
The next body discovered by the narrator is alive (just).  It is the (named) 
body of Friday who is still warm and has a faint pulse. Ironically, against Susan’s 
claim that the daughter, she and Foe are “all alive …all substantial … all in the same 
world” (p. 152), it is the ‘other-worldly’ Friday who lives here while the others are 
lifeless.  The narrator  then “tr[ies]  to  part”  the “clenched” teeth of  Friday with a 
fingernail,  an apt  metaphor for  Susan and Foe’s attempts to  make Friday speak. 
However it is not just Susan and Foe who are implicated in this attempted forced 
entry into Friday’s hole/mouth; the reader is too. I suggest that Coetzee offers here a 
representation of the reader’s (present-tense)  experience of  reading the preceding 
three parts of the novel – “I begin to hear the faintest faraway roar: as she said, the 
roar of waves in a seashell” (p. 154; my emphasis) – an experience in which we too 
(may) have attempted to give Friday voice. In this final part, Friday stirs and “[f]rom 
his mouth, without a breath, issue the sounds of the island” (p. 154). The passive 
grammatical construction makes clear that what “issues” is not a voluntary utterance 
on the part of Friday; furthermore, what issues is not speech, but only “sounds” the 
meaning of which is unfathomable. As readers confronting this still-alive body we 
would do well to remember a conversation between Susan and Foe in Part Three of  
the novel. Here they discuss God’s authorship/writing of the world and Foe says to 
Susan, “it is possible that some of us are not written, but merely are” (p. 143).
In the second variation, the narrator again enters a house; Defoe’s (paternal) 
authority frames the whole: “At one corner of the house, a plaque is bolted to the 
wall.   Daniel  Defoe,  Author,  are  the  words  …” (p.  155),  perhaps  signaling  our 
retrospective entry as later reader.  The narrator discovers what appears to be a box 
full of the letters Susan has (not) written to Foe in Parts One and Two of the novel, or 
perhaps the manuscript of her castaway account. The top page reads “Dear Mr Foe, 
at last I could row no further” (p. 155).  Notwithstanding the important prefaratory 
supplement, designating the addressee of whose existence the reader did not learn 
19
 And here we might remember Susan’s anguished assertion in Part Three: “I am not a story, Mr Foe” 
(131).
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until  the  end of  the  first  section,  these  words  return  to  the  first  moment  of  the 
reader’s interpretative descent into Coetzee’s text, Susan’s quoted20 words at the start 
of Coetzee’s novel: “At last I could row no further…. With a sigh, making barely a 
splash, I slipped overboard” (p. 5).   The narrator in this final section thus enacts, or 
repeats  (with the  notable  supplement  identifying  the  addressee)  the  interpretative 
entry made by the reader-writer on the first page of the Coetzee’s novel, reiterating 
Susan’s words almost verbatim, but with an important change in tense: “With a sigh, 
making barely a splash, I slip overboard” (p. 155).  Are we here invited to “slip” into 
the submerged text(s) within Foe’s text , itself submerged in Coetzee’s?
Having entered the water, the narrator swims to the “dark mass of [a ship] 
wreck,” and passes into “the hole” (p. 156, such a crucial word in what precedes)21 
where s/he discovers the bodies of “Susan Barton and her dead captain” (p. 157). 
This overt naming of the bodies is a cruel trick on those readers who wish to read 
Coetzee’s novel as providing a female counterpart to Defoe’s.  These words annul 
the  ‘truth’  of  everything  in  the  forgoing  narrative  and  radically  revise  the  self-
proclaimed  “substantiality”  of  the  character Susan and her  story.  Perhaps  Susan 
never returned to England from the island or perhaps, dead en route, she never even 
inhabited  the  island  in  the  first  place.   Either  way,  the  ‘true’  woman’s  story, 
supposedly silenced in (De)Foe’s rewriting but given ‘voice’ by Coetzee, was not 
true at all. Susan never spoke her alternative woman’s story: she was/is only spoken 
for/written by Coetzee.
Confronting the submerged body of Friday the narrator tries to speak with 
him, asking “what is this ship?” (p. 157). The watery realm Friday inhabits is then 
described, in a phrase that has troubled many readers of the novel, myself included, 
as being “not a place of words…. It is a place where bodies are their own signs” (p.  
157).  This could,  of course, appear to invite an essentialist  reading of the kind I 
20
 Cf Attwell: “quotation marks before each of [Susan’s] paragraphs  remind […] us constantly that 
this is  not the immaterial language most fiction uses as its  medium, nor even a representation of 
speech,  but  a  representation  in  writing  of  writing.  […] When,  towards the end of  the novel,  the 
quotation marks disappear, the reader is forced to ask question which fiction seldom invites: on what 
occasion and by what means are  these words now being produced, and to what audience are they 
directed?” (“The Silence of the Canon” 73; emphasis original)
21
 Susan speaks of “the story of Friday, which is properly not a story but a puzzle or hole in the  
narrative” (121).  The “hole” might also suggest the tongueless mouth of Friday.
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attribute above to Gubar. But that Friday’s silent body is one that can only be ‘made 
to  speak’  by  the  appropriative  writing  of/giving  voice  by  others  –  whether  Foe, 
Susan, Coetzee or the reader – is, as I have argued above, insisted on throughout Foe. 
Surely, then, Coetzee is not suggesting the possibility of access to signs the meaning 
of which are immanent but unspoken, especially because bodily?
What might it  mean to suggest a body is its  own sign? And as the above 
indicates, I wish to avoid the ‘Gubaresque’ suggestion that blank bodies/texts can 
somehow autonomously articulate  resistant  agency by means of (chosen)  silence. 
For, of course, a body that is read/understood  as a sign is already one subject to 
interpretative  inscription.  I  think  the  key  here  lies  in  the  deceptively  simple 
possessive,  “own.”   Coetzee does not  suggest  that  bodies meaningfully sign (to 
others) via a materiality that is somehow exempt from interpretation.22 (One only has 
to read  Waiting for the Barbarians to understand how emphatically this is not the 
case.)  As Spivak insists in the essay discussed above, signing – “speech” – is by 
definition intersubjective; there can be no “own sign” that means without being read 
by another. An “own sign,” then, may be one owned by the subaltern, othered self, 
yes – but must remain unreadable, meaningless, unless re-signed in approriation or 
ventriloquism.
It is remarkable, but also surely one of the lessons of Coetzee’s novel, with 
what regularity readers nonetheless engage in ventriloqual possession of Friday, or 
his silent body. Indeed, it is extremely hard to resist the desire to impute meaning to 
Friday’s  silence  or  his  “sound.”   In  the  penultimate  paragraph of  the  novel,  the 
narrator again “pass[es] a fingernail across [Friday’s] teeth, trying to find a way in” 
(p. 157).  The novel concludes thus: “His mouth opens.  From inside him comes a 
slow stream, without breath, without interruption.  It flows up through his body and 
out upon me [the narrator]…. Soft and cold, dark and unending, it beats against my 
eyelids, against the skin of my face” (p. 157). The conclusion has often, and to my 
mind  very  mistakenly,  been  read  as  some  sort  of  plenitudinous,  pre-  or  extra-
linguistic  act  of  communication  on  the  part  of  Friday  (and  Coetzee),  as  the 
subaltern’s  expression  of  a  truth/self  somehow  outside  of  the  representational 
22
 Coetzee warns against assuming “that we can exit from the linguistic field, which includes the field 
of fiction in/on which we subsist” (“Achterberg’s” 78).
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violence of Susan/Foe/Coetzee/his reader.  For some readers then, the “slow stream” 
that emits from Friday’ mouth is his ‘true’ voice; “without interruption.”  Blank and 
voiceless  Friday,  in  these  terms,  finally  ‘has  his  say’,  ‘speaks  his  voice’,  voices  
himself – without speaking, while remaining blank to those with authoritative power. 
Just like Gubar/Dinesen’s princess.23 
Sue Kossew, for example, suggests that Coetzee manages not to speak  for 
Friday yet allows him voice by metaphoric sleight of hand: “the author-figure … of 
the final section … avoids speaking for Friday, allowing his voice to emerge only in 
this metaphoric way” (p. 175; my emphasis).  She continues:
The poetic power of the metaphor expressed via the narration could itself 
be  seen  as  a  way  of  speaking which  expresses something  of  the 
slumbering power of Friday’s voice, as do his other non-verbal means of 
communication.  […] [This] allows the voice to become the source of its 
own discursive power…. (p. 176-77; my emphasis)
In this reading, Coetzee evades the charge of speaking for the other, while 
representing  his  voice  nonetheless  –  through  metaphor.  Friday  is  understood  as 
having “voice” and articulating “discursive power” while abstaining from discourse; 
he somehow he maintains the power of “non-verbal … communication.”   He thus 
communicates to Coetzee’s reader, if he failed to do so to Susan and Foe. Given my 
comments above, this “solution,” the proposition of an “alter/native” (Kossew 177) 
voice for Friday in silence that nonetheless communicates, does nothing to treat of 
readerly interpretation.  Metaphors are read and interpreted too.
I  want  to  return  to  the  role  of  the  reader  which  is  too  often,  as  I  have 
suggested, ignored or obfuscated in the fixed attention paid to the politics of writing 
with its focus on authorial authority, and I propose to do so (again) via Spivak – and 
Parry (with Gubar in the margin). Spivak has commented extensively on  Foe, and 
was one of the novel’s earliest, and remains one of its most nuanced, commentators. 
She writes, for example, of “the contrast … between the colonialist [say, Susan or 
23
 Some recent examples: “Here Friday’s body speaks for itself” (Singh xx); “Friday speaks, but not in 
the words of the colonial oppressor” (Upstone 176); “Coetzee gives Friday back his voice” (Hertel  
91).
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Defoe] – who gives the native speech – and the metropolitan anti-imperialist [his 
critical commentators, perhaps] – who wants to give the native voice” (“Theory in 
the Margin” 13).24 It is precisely the nature of this ‘giving voice’ (or the desire to do 
so) that troubles Spivak. It is particularly instructive, in this light, to read Spivak 
alongside (against) Parry, another formidable Coetzee critic. Parry, Spivak suggests, 
censures critics like herself (and Homi Bhabha and Abdul Jan Mohammed) because 
“they will not let the native speak” (16; my emphasis). In response, Spivak offers this 
“particular word” to Parry: “her efforts (to give voice to the native) as well as mine 
(to give warning to the attendant problems) are judged by those strange margins of 
which Friday … is only a mark” (p. 16; my emphasis). A mark, not a sign; a sound, 
not  speech or  writing25 –  and much hangs on  this  distinction.   Recognizing  and 
responding to the strangeness of those “strange margins,” marked but not signed by 
Friday, is precisely what is at stake.
In  a  provocative  essay  on speech and silence  in  Coetzee’s  writing,  Parry 
suggests Coetzee’s critics (she includes Spivak) all read Friday as a “victor” rather 
than a “victim” and credit Friday with “possessing extraordinary and transgressive 
psychic energies” despite (or because of) his silence (p. 156).  She argues that in the 
many critical accounts of Coetzee’s novels the various silenced and silent characters,
all  signify  [or  rather  are  interpreted  as  signifying]  not  a  negative 
condition of lack and affliction, or of sullen withdrawal, but a plenitude 
of perception and gifts … [and ] the outflow of sounds from the mouth of  
Friday gives … tongue to meanings? desires? which precede or surpass 
those that can be communicated and interpreted in formal language. (p. 
153-4; question marks original)
In such readings, she argues, “Friday does not cross the threshold into logical 
and referential discourse, remaining instead in that paradisal condition where sign 
and  object  are  unified,  and  where  the  body,  spared  the  traumatic  insertion  into 
language, can give utterance to things lost or never yet heard…” (p.  155). In this 
24
 This essay is reprinted, largely unchanged in Spivak’s A Critique of Postcolonial Reason (174-97).
25
 In this regard, it is notable just how often critics attempt to interpret the marks Friday makes on the 
slate he is given during literacy lessons, and offer interpretations of these as “alter/native” signs (147).
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respect she finds Coetzee politically delinquent: “the potential critique of political 
oppression is  diverted by the conjuring and endorsing of a  non-verbal signifying 
system” (p. 153); finally, Coetzee’s writing “is marked by the singularity of a textual 
practice which dissipates the engagement with political conditions it also inscribes” 
(p.  164).  In short, Coetzee is to be reprimanded for relegating his oppressed (non-
white) characters to ineffable silence – again, for not letting them speak.
Not all of Coetzee’s oppressed characters are silent, of course, as Parry notes. 
(White) women speak in the novels, or rather are given voice by Coetzee, like Susan 
in  Foe.  On this  “imitation of a  woman’s writing” (p.  158),  when set  against the 
ostensible refusal to grant speech to the (non-white) “dispossessed” such as Friday, 
Parry writes,
…  the  effects  of  bestowing  authority  on  the  woman’s  text,  while 
withholding  discursive  skills  from  the  dispossessed,  is  to  reinscribe, 
indeed re-enact, the received disposal of narrative power, where voice is 
correlated with cultural supremacy and voicelessness with subjugation; 
just as the homages to the mystical properties and prestige of muteness 
undermine the critique of  that  condition where oppression inflicts  and 
provokes silence. (p. 158)
In  response,  I’d  suggest,  first,  that  Parry  confuses  Coetzee’s  critic’s 
interpretations (misreading some) with his textual representations. Second, to suggest 
that  Susan’s  female  narrative  in  Foe is  “bestow[ed]  authority”  is  a  significant 
misunderstanding of Coetzee’s novel which quite clearly portrays the political failure 
(in  gendered  terms)  of  Susan’s  authorship.  We  should  not  forget  that  Susan  is 
silenced  at  the  end  of  Foe,  her  story’s  credibility  –  her  speech  –  is  utterly 
undermined, her identity is annulled, and her body is lifeless. She is exposed as an 
“insubstantial” dummy, ventriloquized not only by Foe/Defoe but also by Coetzee 
and his readers: a “stuffed” woman.
To my mind, Parry’s argument founders on her inability to see past the trope 
of  authorial/textual  dominance.  Within  these  terms  a  ‘writer’  (by  which  term  I 
include the reader as interpretative writer) is wholly authoritative and has just two 
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options: to grant to or withhold speech from the “dispossessed.” The writer may “let” 
an  other  speak  via  representation  in  his/her  writing  (opening  to  the  charge  of 
ventriloquism)  or the writer may decline to represent the other/ the other’s speech 
(opening to the charge of silencing or relegating the other’s voice to the realm of the 
ineffective “ineffable”).  It is an impossible double-bind for the writer, who in both 
scenarios is accused of bad faith and even political betrayal.
What underwrites both accounts – granting speech, inscribing silence – is the 
assumption  of  authorial  fiat:  the  writer  writes  with  full  authority  and his  or  her 
characters / the text is merely the passive product of that authoritative inscription. 
This  assumes  that  writing  is  monologic;  or  rather  it  ignores  that  the  meaning 
attributed to writing (or speech) is a dialogic product (and always deferred).  I submit 
that Coetzee does not simply reify the (authoritative self) writer/ (passive other) text 
binary that sustains tropes of textuality and voice, but crucially emphasizes the role 
of the reader in the dynamic of meaning creation.
For all the reasons given above it is, I think, mistaken to understand  Friday’s 
(textually  represented)  “sound”  or  “stream”  as  signifying  anything  –  whether 
unrepresented truth or the expression of an unmediated intentionality,  unless that 
signification is imposed by a reader. Friday sounds but does not speak. His “stream” 
is described by the narrator as the result of an act that is passive, not intentional: “His 
mouth opens,” he does not “open his mouth”; the stream erupts, he does not expel it.  
What or whether it means for him can only ever be guessed at, imputed, (violently) 
imposed on the impenetrable body/text. It is his body’s “own sign.”
FIVE
A face is imposed on me without me being able to be deaf to its appeal nor to 
forget it ….  Consciousness loses its first place.
( Levinas “The Trace of the Other)
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If  one  could  possess,  grasp,  and  know the  other,  it  would  not  be  other. 
Possessing, knowing, and grasping are synonyms of power.
(Levinas “Time and the Other”)
But this need not relegate Friday – or his represented body – to the realm of 
the  politically  ineffectual.  To  ponder  the  impossibility  of  understanding  Friday’s 
“own sign,” and the complicity of our attempts to know it, is perhaps the point.  Here 
it is instructive, I think, to turn to the work of Emmanuel Levinas.  This is not to 
suggest Coetzee has read or even alludes to Levinas’s work in his writing.26  Rather, 
Levinas’s  work grapples with issues not  dissimilar  to  those  discussed above and 
provides a fruitful (philosophical and metaphoric) language with which to consider 
these further in Coetzee’s novel. My comments in what follows should certainly be 
read  alongside  Michael  Marais’s  exemplary  Levinasian  reading  of  Foe in 
“Disarming  Silence,”  although I  disagree  with  the  claim that  Coetzee  alludes  to 
Levinas in any direct way (137). Levinas accepts, indeed it is the founding premise 
of  his  work,  that  writings  of  the  other  (as  a  metaphor  for  conceptualisation)  are 
always violent (re)readings (and vice versa). As as Derrida asserts in his well-known 
essay “Violence and Metaphysics” (a response to Levinas’s early Time and Infinity), 
“[t]he other cannot be what it is, infinitely other, except in finitude and mortality 
(mine  and its). It is such as soon as it comes into language – but has not Levinas 
taught us that there is no thought before language?” (“Violence”, p. 143; emphasis 
original). 
This  said,  for  Levinas  our  engagements  with  others  are  not  only  acts  of 
masterful  (and  violent)  ‘textual’  self-consciousness.  Importantly,  too,  however 
paradoxically,  it  is  only  within language  (‘writing’  or  ‘speaking’)  that  one 
experiences one’s responsibility to the other. I have similarly argued above that for 
Coetzee  (reading as)  writing  is  always a  violent  act  that,  nonetheless,  invites  an 
ethical encounter. The question then becomes what might mitigate despair  at  this 
26
 I am by no means the first to read Coetzee’s work in light of Levinas’s writings; in fact this is an 
increasingly  common  critical  approach.  The  work  of  Michael  Marais,  in  his  many  readings  of 
Coetzee’s novels, is exemplary; see, especially, in relation to  Foe, “Disarming Silence.”  See also 
Meffan and Worthington; Jordaan and Drichel.
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(linguistic) violence (cf. early Spivak), if not abstention from speaking or writing, 
imagined as expressive (cf.  Gubar), or denial imagined as betrayal (cf. Parry)?
Levinas urges refusal of an ontology that presupposes the pre-eminence of 
intentionality, nothing less than a radical revision of post-Cartesian notions of the 
self: he argues for subjectivity (and so ethical engagement) as constituted (also) in 
the experience of bodily proximity with the other, or in the excess (Spivak’s “strange 
margins”)  –  onto  which  this  opens.27  Against  the  violence  of  knowing  (as 
writing/speaking) Levinas posits “touching, interpreted not as palpation but as caress, 
and  language,  interpreted  not  as  the  traffic  of  information  but  as  contact” 
(“Substitution” 80; emphasis original).  This claim is of course figurative, utilising 
metaphors “to describe proximity [of self and other] as irreducible to consciousness 
and thematization. [It] is a relationship with what cannot be resolved into ‘images’ 
and  exposed,”  a  relationship  with  the  other  that  is  always  “incommensurate” 
(“Substitution” 80; emphasis original).  Intersubjective relations, he argues, are too 
often predicated on  desire28 for possession of the other (if not bodily then via the 
self’s  cognitive  inscription).  Ethics,  for  Levinas,  lies  in  the  (recognition  of  the) 
failure of that desire, the “failure of possession” (“Time and the Other”, p.  51). In 
terms of the above discussion, in  facing what Parry calls the “ineffable” other we 
recognize that we cannot  own the other’s body, its “own sign,” regardless of the 
desire to possess it. In this respect, I strongly contest Parry’s assertion that Coetzee’s 
writing “valorize[s] the body as an agent of cognition” (“Speech and Silence” 158; 
my  emphasis).  “Cognition”  is  precisely  what  the  alterity  of  the  (metaphorical) 
affective body of the other resists. 
The “face,” a crucial and central concept for Levinas, particularly in his early 
work, is guarantor of the other’s sensible, material being, the site where proximity is 
experienced, at the level of the skin, of the touch that is felt, a “contact” that affects,  
before it is known or re-cognized. In ethical engagement with the other, “[a] face is 
27
 See Critchley Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity, 63-4. Ethical subjectivity “is lived in the sensibility of a 
corporeal obligation to the other” (64; my emphasis); “It is because the self is sensible, that is to say,  
vulnerable, passive, open to wounding, outrage and pain, but also open to the movement of the erotic, 
that it is capable or worthy of ethics” (64). This is not to return to an essentialist notion of the body as 
underwriting a shared conception of subjectivity, but rather to suggest that in bodily proximity we are  
exposed to an experience of an other’s (self) ownership that refuses our possession.  
28
 Such a crucial word in Foe, as suggested above.
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imposed on me without me being able to be deaf to its appeal nor to forget it …. 
Consciousness loses its first place” (“The Trace of the Other”; qtd in Robbins, p. 
12).  In these terms, the face of the other denotes (the possibility of) an affective 
relationship premised on not  speaking for the other, or  allowing the other speech. 
The ethical encounter, 
…  realizes  and  sustains  …  the  proximity  of  person  to  person,  the 
proximity of one’s neighbour or the welcome we prepare for one another. 
It is a mode of thought that cannot be reduced to an act of knowing in 
which truths are constituted …. ( Levinas Outside the Subject, p. 1) 
Put another way, the ethical encounter is a mode of listening, rather than the 
giving or taking away of voice. Crucially, for Levinas, the response of the self to the 
face / body of the other is  not realized, in both the senses of that word: it is not 
‘understood’ and not ‘achieved.’29 Levinas asks, rhetorically, whether this responsive 
relationship can be “be characterized as a failure?” and continues:
Once again, the answer is yes, if one adopts the terminology of current  
descriptions, if one wants to characterize the erotic [union with the other] 
by ‘grasping’, ‘possessing’, or ‘knowing’.  But  … [i]f one could possess, 
grasp, and know the other, it would not be other.  Possessing, knowing, 
and grasping are synonyms of power. (“Time and the Other”, p. 51)
Here, then, is the crucial paradox of Levinas’s thought, productively read, I 
think, with respect to Spivak’s (notorious) claim that the subaltern cannot “speak” (or 
be “heard” or “read” in her later formulation): commun(icat)ion with the other, as an 
attempt to speak (for)/write that other, cannot succeed.  Or rather, to be ethical, it 
must fail. It must not be realized unless as conquest.  In his later work, and arguably 
in  response  to  Derrida’s  critique,  Levinas  turns  his  attention  to  language  and 
representation,  language  (re)conceived  in  Derridian  terms  as  a  process  in  which 
29
 Cf. Marais, “the image of reading in Foe is couched in the ethical terms of an encounter with the 
face” (“Disarming Silence” 138).
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meaning  is  continually  deferred  –  always  “interrupted”,  “reiterated”  –  in  the 
movement of différance.30
Levinasian ethics is fundamentally hermeneutic in conception.  It begins with 
the problematic of the violence of writing and posits the solution of ethical reading 
which, in short, questions its own interpretative authority.  If, as the above implies, 
one can posit an ethics at the heart of Coetzee’s novel that shares an affinity with the 
thought of Levinas, can one begin to derive a politics from this aesthetics? And what 
might such a politics look like?  For a start, it would be a politics that refuses the 
reification of the binary of self and other, via metaphors of authorial mastery of the 
passive  text,  a  binary  in  the  face  of  which  there  is,  for  the  other,  only  suicidal 
abstention, the refusal to ‘voice’ (unless in the impossible assertion of unmediated 
self-expression, as for Gubar, or a benevolent ‘giving voice’ in re-presentation) or 
abject silence.
Ethics,  so  conceived,  is  experienced  precisely  as  the  realization  that  one 
cannot father the text, as the failure of desire for possession and ownership, and that 
beyond the self’s knowing or signing is an excess – or margin of strangeness – that 
we cannot master. But, we might well ask, how might this realization be ethical – or 
for that matter political?  Levinas’s work is again instructive.  He suggests that the 
failure  to  know/possess  the  other  can  be  reconceived  in  positive  terms  as  the 
opening of the reading/writing (conceived) self (the “said” of self-certainty) to the 
disruption of the other’s affective presence (a “saying” the meaning of which cannot 
be  fixed).  This,  he  argues,  invokes  radical  self-questioning which  “calls  me into 
question” (“Ethics as first  Philosophy” 83; emphasis original).  Ethics, he argues 
30
 In Otherwise than Being and the works that follow it, Levinas strives to articulate the interruption of 
(conscious)  being  by  that  which  is  otherwise,  beyond  being  (as  consciousness).   He  formulates 
empirical language, language that adequates the other, as “the said”.  The said designates, thematizes,  
imposes teleology, reduces the ethical/other to an object in the self’s incriptions.  Against this he 
posits  language  as  performative,  as  interruptive  process,  as  an  accusative (ethically  and 
grammatically)  to  which  calls  for  response.  While  the  “saying”  is  itself  a  linguistic  figure,  it 
metaphorically denotes that which cannot – and in terms of Levinasian ethics must not – be finally  
said.   If  “[i]n language qua said everything is conveyed before us … at  the price of  a  betrayal” 
(Otherwise 6), nonetheless “the saying that is absorbed in the said is not exhausted” (Otherwise 47), it 
“imprints its trace on the thematization itself” (Otherwise 46-7).
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again and again, is “the putting into question of my spontaneity by the presence of 
the Other” (Totality and Infinity, p. 43).31
It is then less a matter of what a sign signifies, or what might have been said, 
if allowed. Rather, what matters is the disruptive effect of a body/ “own sign” on a 
reader who acknowledges the other’s existence as otherwise  owned – as “beyond 
[the  self’s]  being”  (or  knowing).   Friday’s  silence,  like  his  body’s  “own  sign,” 
doesn’t  (needn’t)  signify  or  be  made  to  signify  in  interpretation:  it  affects.  The 
challenge in reading (as in writing) Friday (the other, the dispossessed) is to resist the 
attempt to own his sign in representation or interpretation, and to acknowledge the 
failure of possession or ownership.  Fridays “sound” is a  ‘saying’ that  is  felt,  not 
‘said.’ It is felt moreover, in Coetzee’s novel, by the narrator on the “skin of [the 
narrator’s] face” (the words with which the novel ends, 157). Friday, paradoxically, 
like  Levinas’s  metaphorical  “face”,  can  be  understood  to  represent  the 
unrepresentable,  disruptive  effect  of  the  unknown  and  unknowable  other  on  the 
reading/writing self. ‘I’ don’t need to know his (intended) meaning for this to occur. 
In fact the opposite.  It is precisely his alterity and unknowability, that calls me – this 
reader, at this moment in time – into question.32
I  am  suggesting,  then,  that  Coetzee  extends  theoretical  claims  about  the 
violence of writing by promoting what might be called and ethics – and aesthetics – 
of  affective  reading that  doesn’t  (only)  focus  on the problems that  inhere  in  the 
writing of the other, in the giving or finding of his/her voice. I am by no means 
suggesting Coetzee is  an acolyte  of  Levinas,  far  from it,  but  rather  that  the  two 
writers share an understanding of affective reading that each attempts to articulate in 
ways  that,  for  all  their  differences,  share  some  significant  metaphors  and 
understandings and are fruitfully considered together. There are many other critical 
31
 This is not to deny that the body of the other, the text,  can always be imagined as owned by the 
writer/reader.  It  is  to  understand,  first,  that  such  reduction  is  inadequate,  unethical,  and  simply 
reasserts the will of the conceiving ego.  Such ‘reading’/’writing’ affords certitude only by denying 
the  effect  of  that  bodily/textual  encounter,  which  is  precisely  the  disruptive  opening  up  to  self-
critique.
32
 Waiting from the Barbarians offers another portrayal of the affective face in the Magistrate’s final 
encounter with Colonel Joll (146) and throughout the text the body of barbarian girl frustrates the 
Magistrate’s (and reader’s) desire for possession. Michael K’s emaciated body functions similarly in 
Michael K.). Marais writes of encounters with those “irreducible to logocentric conceptuality” (133) 
as ones that result in the “insecurity of responsibility” (137).
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approaches might lead to a reading not dissimilar to that I’ve tentatively sketched in 
this essay. One such example is Derek Attridge’s very fine account of  Foe,  which 
reads the novel via questions of canonicity (fundamentally questions about inclusion 
and exclusion, of who is (not) allowed to ‘write’ or be ‘read’).  He suggests that for  
readers uncomfortably aware of their cultural inclusion in a dominant group, “there is 
no simple remedy to be understood in terms of investing Friday with speech” (p. 86). 
Further,
Coetzee’s novels do not represent a yearning for some realm of richness 
and plenitude beyond language, a meaningfulness behind the emptiness 
of our conscious lives. They attempt strenuously to avoid both terms of 
the colonizer’s contradiction …: that the other is wholly knowable, and 
that the other is wholly mysterious; that the other has no boundaries, and 
that the boundaries of the other are impenetrable. (p. 89)
With  respect  to  Friday’s  silence  he  argues,  “its  powerful  effects are 
everywhere”  (82;  emphasis  original),  effects  that  encourage  us  to  contemplate 
“political and cultural  procedures that will  allow us not  just  to hear each other’s 
stories, as the liberal humanist dream would have it, but to hear – and this will entail 
a different kind of hearing – each other’s silences”, p. 90).
I  have  argued,  then,  as  Attridge  argues  too,  that  Coetzee  urges  a 
reconsideration of self-other relations that begins with a reconceptualisation of the 
reading subject (s/he who reads the other) – always already a writer – called into 
question by the affective “own sign” of an unreadable mark, a speechless sound, or 
silence. Rather than exclusion or the granting of inclusion, what is promoted is a 
politics of intersubjective interpretation – a hearing or reading in which, faced with 
the silent and unreadable text/body of the other, an ethical reader forgoes the self-
certitude  of  authorship.  In  this,  the  mastery of  consciousness,  and the subject  as 
consciousness,  is  called  into  question  by  the  alterity  that  is  a  “strange  margin” 
marked by the silent  other.  We are encouraged to ‘hear’ differently,  to attend to 
silence. This is a long way from a textual politics that either seeks an impossibly 
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unmediated  expressive  autonomy  for  the  “speaking”  other  (Gubar),  or  seeks  to 
“allow” that other speech (Parry).
As I understand Coetzee’s work, writing is always represented as the violent 
apprehension of otherness.  But writing is also represented, again and again, as the 
failure to represent the own other, marked by his/her body. It is this failure that Foe 
exposes to scrutiny. Acknowledging the failure of writerly authority, the failure to 
own in interpretation the mark of otherness, opens me, the (writing) reader, always, 
to  (self)  questioning.  And  this  (self)  interrogation  is  precisely  what  mitigates 
ostensible authorial power. In that opening, in that recognition of endless reiteration 
and reevaluation,  lies the possibility of new narratives for the reading self  and a 
politics that begins in self-questioning and the refusal of authority.
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